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I. INTRODUCTION 
Spain’s transition to democracy after General 
Francisco Franco’s death in 1975 is widely 
considered a success story and is sometimes 
presented as a model for other transitions from 
authoritarian regimes, particularly in Latin 
America. Four decades after the transition the 
main leaders of the process are now deceased or 
retired from politics, and within Spain, there is 
growing public demand for a fresh assessment of 
its merits. In Spain, as a way out of authoritarian 
rule, the Spanish experience is still overwhelmingly 
perceived as a positive example; however, when 
the stability of its territorial system and the type 
of societal values upon which a pluralist political 
culture can be sustained are considered the views 
become more critical. 
In its simplest version, pluralism implies valuing 
social diversity as a democratic asset, and not 
as a hindrance to be managed or tackled. In 
Spain, the transition from authoritarian rule to 
democracy involved more than the restoration of 
standard political liberties and the rule of law. The 
new democratic system also had to facilitate the 
cohabitation of multiple ethno-territorial identities 
within a single political framework, while also 
secularizing the state and implementing some form 
of transitional justice for the victims of the Civil War 
and the dictatorship.1
The territorial model that was finally devised—a 
system of regional autonomy with some degree of 
asymmetry—was somewhat improvised and was the 
result of brisk negotiations among heterogeneous 
political groups. Framed in very flexible terms, the 
resulting model was nonetheless able to drive a 
political cycle that has lasted for over three decades. 
On the negative side, the very same elements 
that distinguished this territorial model—that is, 
inter-regional competition and the dynamics of 
nationalist politics—have prevented its eventual 
stabilization. The ambiguity on the limits of the 
devolution process, together with its procedural 
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openness—which were at one point praised as signs 
of institutional resilience and political capacity to 
compromise—are now often perceived as structural 
handicaps. The same can be said about other 
decisions made during the transition—for instance, 
entrenching the privileges of the Catholic Church 
or avoiding the politics of memory. The option 
of closure and forgiveness for the crimes of the 
Civil War and the dictatorship made it easier for 
the new political elites to start with a clean slate, 
but historical oblivion has taken a heavy toll on 
Spanish civic culture. Without effective normative 
references, counteracting the existing hegemony of 
traditionalist Catholic values, social clientelism and 
political corruption has proven difficult. 
The reasons for these choices and the subsequent 
loss of political functionality are various. Political 
realism offers one explanation: the transition 
rendered the best political result it could achieve 
without risking an authoritarian backlash 
considering the balance of forces in the 1970s, when 
the apparatus of the dictatorship was still intact and 
the opposition was weak. The dynamics of social 
change suggests another explanation: younger 
generations severely hit by the 2008 recession are 
less inclined to accept as legitimate some of the 
accommodations made before they were born. The 
social reverberations of the economic downturn—
including staggering cases of corruption and 
increased protest and mobilization—have produced 
a generalized sense of malaise which, in turn, has 
undermined the basic pillars of the country, that 
is, the territorial structure, the welfare-state social 
model and the perceived roles of political parties, 
the judiciary and the monarchy. 
This overall erosion of legitimacy has resulted 
in growing concerns about the capacity of 
the institutional system to respond to such 
combinations of economic, social and political 
pressures. This changing social mindset has 
also begun to alter the received narrative of the 
transition, as well as the political consensus upon 
which it was based. There are now an increasing 
number of voices questioning the legacy of this 
consensus and blaming its original limitations 
for current social ailments such as the lack of 
recognition of the former regime’s victims, the 
non-accountability and self-reproductive tendencies 
of political elites, or the inability to stabilize the 
territorial model. According to these critical voices, 
such shortcomings reveal the incapacity of the 
Spanish democracy to break with the ingrained 
interests and values inherited from Francoism 
which were incorporated into the political culture 
of the country. As a result of these forces and 
reflections, forty years later, Spain is experiencing a 
critical reassessment of the drivers of its democracy 
with increasing talk about the need for a “second 
transition”.  
This change case identifies the original challenges 
faced by the Spanish transition to democracy, the 
factors that favoured pluralist responses to them—
with a particular emphasis on their territorial 
dimension—and the long-term or unintended 
consequences of some of the options chosen. On the 
whole, the Spanish transition has been a success 
story, but only in a limited or provisional sense. 
On the one hand, compared to the four civil wars 
and countless uprisings, coups and mutinies that 
the country experienced during the preceding 
two centuries, the democratic system installed 
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since 1977 has produced the longest period of 
political freedom and the rule of law in Spain’s 
modern history. Up to 2008, decentralization 
also resulted in a more even distribution of the 
benefits of sustained economic growth, as well as 
the cultural recovery and institutionalization of 
regional vernaculars. On the other hand, some 
of the country’s old territorial tensions have not 
been resolved. The years of transition witnessed a 
ruthless increase in terrorist violence originating 
in the Basque Country that was only curbed thirty 
years later. While the situation in this region seems 
to have settled, a more powerful independence 
movement has emerged in Catalonia as the 
result of a failed and profoundly controversial 
territorial reform and bitterly felt socio-economic 
deterioration. Catalan nationalism portrays the 
regional consequences of the 2008 economic crisis 
as Spanish “fiscal plundering.” Although economic 
hardship and the social frustrations attached to it 
have fed centrifugal pressures in the regions, within 
Spain as a whole further devolution does not enjoy 
the same degree of support it had forty years ago.
The decision not to look backward at the crimes 
of the past, or to effect some form of symbolic 
reparation for the victims of the Civil War and 
the dictatorship, has also blurred the historical 
credentials of Spanish democracy, in part by giving 
leeway to regressive theories about the “beneficial” 
effects of Franco’s regime for having allegedly 
created the pre-conditions of a successful transition. 
This lack of collective memory is reflected in 
the recurrent “cultural wars” that emerge in the 
political arena. The secularization of the state, the 
extension of the public educational system and the 
recognition of civil rights such as divorce, women’s 
equality and reproductive rights were integral parts 
of the political agenda of the transition. However, 
the institutional privileges of the Catholic Church 
were maintained, thereby allowing it to assume a 
role as a main interlocutor with the government 
on educational and moral issues, such as in recent 
debates on abortion, same-sex marriage and 
the introduction of civic education in the school 
syllabus. Similarly, voters often exhibit tolerance 
for the pervasive corruption that has seized the 
political system (and for which devolution offered a 
fertile ground), regularly re-electing politicians who 
are under suspicion—although this mindset seems 
to have receded with the current economic crisis. 
Nonetheless, many socially-ingrained obstacles still 
thwart the struggle against political corruption.
II. ORIGINS AND RESPONSES 
TO DIVERSITY IN MODERN 
SPAIN
Although part of Southern Europe’s “third wave” 
of democratization in the mid-1970s,2 the Spanish 
transition had its own tempo and characteristics. 
Although it took place after a bloody civil war and 
almost forty years of dictatorship, it was not the 
result of a political revolution or the collapse of 
an authoritarian regime, as in Portugal or Greece. 
Instead, it was carried out through a process of 
negotiated political reform with the opposition. 
The transitional process faced a combination of 
challenges, among them drafting a democratic 
constitution; resolving Spain’s membership in the 
Western structure of international relations, mainly 
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the European Community and NATO; creating a 
modern welfare state and a more equitable society; 
and instituting a territorial model that met the 
expectations of Catalan and Basque nationalists 
without triggering the reaction of conservative 
forces such as the army. Some related issues, 
such as the separation of church and state and the 
secularization of the educational and civil rights 
system, had been simmering since the nineteenth 
century due to the historical weakness of the liberal 
state against the combined influence of the social 
oligarchy and the Catholic Church. Intense class 
conflict and territorial tensions with Catalonia 
and the Basque region were by-products of both 
Spain’s late and unequal industrialization and the 
imbalance created by a weak political centre and an 
economically stronger periphery. These cleavages 
were exacerbated in the twentieth century by the 
crisis of the monarchy, the instability of the Second 
Republic (1931–39), the Civil War (1936–39) and 
Franco’s long dictatorship (1939–75). In addition 
to these pressures, the restoration of democracy in 
the 1970s was challenged by an escalating terrorist 
offensive led by Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), a 
movement for Basque independence, and by the 
need for urgent economic reforms precipitated by 
the 1973 international oil crisis.
By itself, the variety of languages in Spain does not 
explain the existence or character of the country’s 
regional or territorial tensions. Cultural differences 
have to be considered in combination with the 
political transformations and the social makeup of 
the different regions. Historically, Basque, Catalan 
or Galician polities have never existed that replicate 
the imagined nationalist territories of Euskal 
Herria (literally “the land of the Basque people”), 
which comprises the current Basque Country and 
Navarre in Spain and the department of the Atlantic 
Pyrenees in France, or of Països Catalans (“Catalan 
Countries”), which would include Catalonia, 
Valencia and the Balearic Islands in Spain and the 
department of the Eastern Pyrenees in France. 
What we find instead is a changing variety of wider 
political structures originally based on dynastic 
kinship and feudal rights. Variants of the Catalan 
language are spoken in Valencia, the Balearic 
Islands and southern France, but they have never 
inspired an effective pan-Catalanist movement. The 
same is true for the Basque language, which is also 
spoken in the north of Navarre and on the French 
side of the border. Galician has its linguistic nest 
in the northwest of the Peninsula, with its cultural 
affinity to Portugal, but its brand of nationalism has 
been slower and more diluted than the others. The 
Islamic heritage of Andalusia persists more as an 
architectural patrimony than a living culture. 
Spain emerged as a modern nation-state out of a 
multi-ethnic empire legitimized by Catholicism and 
dynastic kinship without the implied institutional 
separation of secular and religious spheres, or 
the cultural and political homogenization of the 
country. The liberal state was never strong enough 
to impose a uniform, French-styled national culture. 
Nineteenth-century political elites distrusted 
the masses and displayed little interest in public 
education; at the same time, the fiscal base of the 
state was too weak and the influence of the Catholic 
Church too strong to organize an efficient and 
secular public school system. Besides, centrifugal 
tensions were not always synonymous with ethnic 
cleavages. The federal system attempted by the 
short-lived First Republic (1873–74), for example, 
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rapidly disintegrated into a general swirl of 
cantonal movements led by radical republicans. 
The fiercest resistance to the establishment of a 
liberal constitutional system came from the regions 
but for different reasons. Some had either lost or 
preserved some degree of autonomy from the Old 
Regime. Others had experienced the social shock 
of industrialization first. Two—Catalonia and the 
Basque provinces—had had retained a distinctive 
language.  
Modern Basque and Catalan nationalisms 
emerged shortly after the military defeat of 
Carlism, a clerical, reactionary movement against 
liberalism, in 1876. Although internally complex 
and dissimilar in their ideological articulation and 
political objectives—the linguistic brand of political 
Catalanism contrasts with the racialist bias of early 
Basque nationalism—both shared some common 
features, such as a rural social base, a connection to 
traditional Catholic values, a romantic longing for 
a lost “golden age” and the defence of their cultural 
and political heritage. Originally, Catalanism was 
part of a broader “regenerationist” movement that 
seized the shaken self-confidence of Spanish elites 
after the Spanish-American War in 1898, which 
resulted in the loss of Spain’s last colonies in the 
Caribbean and the Pacific. This soul-searching 
was more intellectual than political and produced 
widely different diagnoses of the nation’s ailments, 
but a revival of regionalism and demands for 
decentralization were an integral part of it. Some 
elites from the periphery of the country, particularly 
in Catalonia, concluded that Spain’s prospect for the 
regeneration was better if the process was led from 
the most developed and ambitious regions, rather 
than from its decadent core. Two main parties 
came to wield the banner of regional nationalism 
in the Basque Country and Catalonia: the Basque 
Nationalist Party and the Regionalist League, 
founded in 1895 and 1901 respectively. Whereas the 
first aimed at independence from Spain, the second 
sought the restoration of lost Catalan institutions. 
Eventually, some groups united around the Estat 
Catalá (Catalan State) party after concluding that 
the cultural, social and economic plenitude of 
Catalonia would never be achieved as long as the 
region remained a part of Spain. The successful 
struggle of Ireland for independence in 1921 became 
a mirror for both nationalist movements. In both 
cases, the liquidation of the oligarchic system—
established after the restoration of the Bourbon 
dynasty in 1874—was considered a prerequisite for 
any solution to the “national question” in Spain.
The Second Republic (1931–39) was the first serious 
pluralist response to the territorial articulation of 
the country in the twentieth century. This republic 
was not inspired by federalist principles, but 
by the idea of creating a “comprehensive state” 
(Estado integral) with autonomous municipalities 
and regions. Public intellectuals who entered the 
political arena, such as José Ortega y Gasset and 
Manuel Azaña, helped to disseminate the idea of 
regional autonomy as a way to pull the country 
out of its historical stagnation. The Catalan 
Statute of Autonomy—the only such statute to be 
passed before the Civil War—was adopted by the 
Spanish parliament in 1932. The Basque Statute 
was proclaimed in October 1936, by which time 
the war was already underway. In contrast, the 
Statute of Autonomy for Galicia, was presented 
to the Parliament in July 1936 but it was never 
processed as Galacia fell on the insurrectional 
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side. Aided by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy and 
sanctioned by the Catholic Church, a coalition of 
the military and an array of conservative forces won 
the Civil War, resulting in the suppression of the 
autonomy projects and the imposition of a strongly 
centralized, authoritarian and nationalistic regime. 
In 1947, Spain was again proclaimed a monarchy 
with General Franco appointed as regent for life 
until the Spanish throne was occupied.
III. THE SPANISH 
TRANSITION FROM 
AUTHORITARIAN RULE
Banned from the new international order that 
issued from the Second World War, Franco’s 
dictatorship initially survived through economic 
autarky amidst general impoverishment and 
frenzied political repression. On the external scene, 
it developed a substitute diplomacy based on a 
strategic alliance with the Vatican and some key 
Latin American countries. The regime granted 
the Catholic Church the type of autonomy and 
political protection that it had been seeking for 
over a century, handing over to it the educational 
system, part of the mass media and the control 
of censorship. In exchange, the regime obtained 
international support and a convenient design 
of the Spanish Church from the Vatican. This 
peculiar combination of militarism, authoritarian 
nationalism and Catholic traditionalism is usually 
referred to as “National-Catholicism” and gave 
Franco’s regime its particular brand. 
Within the context created by the Cold War, 
Franco’s Spain gained new geostrategic value for the 
United States and its Western allies. Agreements 
for economic and military cooperation signed by 
Spain and the United States in 1953, and the visit 
of President Dwight Eisenhower to Spain in 1959, 
marked a new era of comparative openness for the 
regime. Indeed, beginning in the 1960s, Franco’s 
dictatorship began to define itself as an “organic 
democracy”, that is, as a corporatist system built 
upon the institutional pillars of family, municipality 
and state-controlled trade unions. This innovation 
led some social scientists to typify Spain as an 
example of an “authoritarian regime” rather than 
a totalitarian state.3 Although incorporation into 
the European Common Market was blocked until 
the democratic period, the last phase of Franco’s 
long dictatorship was accompanied by swift 
economic development. Domestically, shifting 
balances between the regime’s different “political 
families” also defined this period. On one side 
were the intransigent Francoists, to be found 
mainly in the military, war veterans’ organizations 
and the security apparatus. The philo-fascist and 
nationalistic Falange, the only party officially 
permitted, was another recognizable group, but by 
the 1960s it had lost much of its original clout and 
had become instead a large, stagnant bureaucracy 
controlling the official trade unions system. There 
was also a small, languishing monarchical lobby that 
advocated Don Juan de Borbón, the son of the last 
Spanish king, as Franco’s successor. Another group 
of technocratic modernizers, under the umbrella of 
the Catholic organization Opus Dei, lead the process 
of economic modernization under the protection 
of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco’s second in 
command. However, the economic modernization of 
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the regime did not produce political liberalization. 
On the contrary, the technocrats of the Opus Dei 
sought institutional perpetuation. Only some rival 
groups, stemming from the Falangist bureaucracy, 
encouraged a limited opening of popular political 
participation, but under strict state control.
The prosperity of the 1960s created a new urban 
middle class in Spain that valued social stability 
above everything and provided a diffuse base of 
support for the regime, which some social scientists 
have called “sociological Francoism.”4 At the same 
time, industrial development created a new working 
class, while massive emigration and a growing 
inflow of tourists offered Spaniards opportunities 
to compare their country’s standing with the rest of 
Western Europe. Economic growth, social change 
and cultural openings brought some turbulence, 
including the first miners’ strikes in northern Spain, 
the infiltration of the official trade unions system 
by left-wing organizers, the radicalization of the 
student movement and the erosion of the alliance 
between the Catholic Church and the regime. In this 
context, the proclamation in 1969 of Juan Carlos 
de Borbón y Borbón as Prince of Spain and the 
future successor of Franco as head of the state and 
as a king, was viewed as a triumph of the regime’s 
most conservative sectors. Franco and Don Juan de 
Borbón, the exiled father of Juan Carlos who lived in 
Portugal, agreed in 1948 that the son would be sent 
to Spain to receive an education under the regime’s 
tutelage, but at the time no further details were 
decided about his future. Franco’s decision to name 
Juan Carlos his successor caused a breach in the 
legitimate Bourbon dynasty’s chain of succession 
that resulted in a rift between father and son.
Cultural and political activism with a nationalist 
tinge also made a comeback in Catalonia and the 
Basque Country in the 1960s. Whereas Catalanism 
generally followed a peaceful strategy, political 
violence broke out in the Basque region. In 1960, 
a bomb at the train station in San Sebastian 
produced the first victim of the new terrorist 
group ETA (the acronym for “Basque Homeland 
and Freedom”). In 1967, a policeman was killed 
and a year later the organization committed its 
first targeted assassination, killing an agent of 
Franco’s secret police. The reaction of the regime 
was fierce. The recurrent declaration of the state of 
emergency reduced the regime’s already feeble legal 
guarantees, hardened repression and paralyzed 
the possibility of widened political openings. 
ETA initiated an offensive based on an escalating 
“action-reaction” principle that was supposed 
to climax in a massive insurrection by Basque 
society. In December 1973, ETA killed Admiral 
Carrero Blanco, the head of government, in an 
elaborate bomb attack in Madrid, thus leaving 
the ultraconservative sector of Francoism without 
a leader. This same year, a new radical left-wing 
group, the Revolutionary Antifascist Patriotic 
Front (FRAP), joined the violent front against the 
dictatorship. In response, the government arrested 
scores of opposition militants, court-martialed a 
dozen of them and, on 27 September 1975, executed 
three members of FRAP and two of ETA. These 
actions resulted in international condemnation, 
ranging from the withdrawal of many ambassadors 
from Spain to censure at the United Nations as 
well as demonstrations in many foreign cities, 
calls for economic boycott, and the burning of the 
Spanish embassy in Lisbon. The regime reacted by 
orchestrating a massive demonstration in support of 
8     Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies Global Centre for Pluralism
The Spanish Transition Forty Years Later
a senile-looking Franco on 1 October, the very same 
day that a new and obscure terrorist group, the First 
of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Group (GRAPO), 
killed four policemen in Madrid. This was the last 
time that Franco was seen in public. A few days later 
he fell into a coma and, after much agony, died on 
20 November 1975 at age 82.
After the Republican defeat in the Civil War and 
the crushing of the last remaining guerrilla activity 
in the 1950s, internal political opposition to 
Franco’s dictatorship was very weak. Clandestine 
anarchist, communist and socialist cells were 
repeatedly infiltrated and dismantled by the police 
and their leaders often executed. In the 1960s, 
some internal dissidents made tenuous contact 
with external liberal, Christian-democratic and 
monarchical groups. The Spanish Communist Party, 
which distanced itself from the Soviet orthodoxy, 
advocated a program of “national reconciliation” 
and was quite successful in penetrating the official 
union movement and making its influence felt in 
the student movement. By the time of Franco’s 
death in 1975, it was by far the best organized and 
disciplined political organization inside the country. 
By contrast, the Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) 
suffered a split between internal clandestine groups 
and the party’s exiled leadership that would only 
be overcome at the party congress in Suresnes, 
France, in 1974. At this meeting, a new group from 
inside the country—which included future Prime 
Minister Felipe González—took control and the 
newly mended party issued a political declaration 
favouring “democratic rupture” with the Franco 
regime and the creation of a federal republic. 
Decentralization and democratic transition went 
hand in hand, with the resolution also supporting 
recognition of the “right to self-determination for 
the Iberian nationalities,” so that each of them could 
“freely determine its relations with the other peoples 
that constitute the Spanish state.”5
During the last years of the Franco regime, social 
unrest and opposition to the regime mounted.  
Countless demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins, 
occupations of public buildings, terrorist attacks, 
police repression and right-wing vigilantism created 
a politically-charged atmosphere. Communist 
groups were particularly active in the grassroots 
movements and in the working-class districts of 
the big cities. In the industrial northern region, the 
Workers’ Commissions (CCOO), a new clandestine 
union pushed by Catholic and Communist militants, 
enjoyed considerable support. In the Basque 
Country and in Catalonia, nationalist mobilization 
gained a prominent role. The Catholic Church also 
took a more critical stance towards the regime. 
Catholic sympathy for Basque nationalism led to a 
serious diplomatic incident with the Vatican in 1974. 
The great unknown was how the bulk of Spanish 
society would react after the death of the dictator. 
Prolonging Francoism without Franco—as Marcelo 
Caetano had done with the authoritarian Estado 
Novo in Portugal after dictator Antonio Salazar 
retired—seemed an option without much future. 
The main political actors faced a political dilemma 
after the death of the dictator: either a political 
break with the regime or a negotiated reform 
process. 
A few months after his accession to the throne, 
King Juan Carlos I appointed a new head of 
government, Adolfo Suárez—until then, a rather 
unremarkable bureaucrat within the Falangist 
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state apparatus and the so-called “National 
Movement” and a former director of the public 
broadcasting system. This was an unexpected move 
by the King, since no great reform initiative was 
expected from Suárez considering his background. 
In the meanwhile, the main opposition forces 
had coalesced into a self-declared “Platform of 
Democratic Organizations” in order to negotiate 
the preconditions for a democratic process with 
the new government. Their conditions included 
political amnesty, legalization of all political parties, 
dissolution of the political police and abrogation of 
their emergency powers, trade union freedom, the 
return of the exiles, a new constituent assembly, 
and recognition of the right to self-government by 
the country’s different nationalities and regions. In 
less than a year, Premier Suárez steered the Law for 
Political Reform through the Francoist legislature 
before its dissolution and held a referendum on 
it. He legalized all political parties, including the 
Communist Party, organized an electoral coalition 
for his own political purposes (the Union of the 
Democratic Centre) and called for constituent 
assembly elections. The opposition, with its many 
and divergent interests, was unable to maintain a 
united front and ended up bargaining separately 
with the government. In the end, there was no 
“democratic rupture” with the past, but a negotiated 
process of gradual reforms, during which appeals to 
“consensus” and to “learning from the past” became 
mottos that dominated the political discourse.
IV. THE STRUGGLES 
FOR PLURALISM: THE 
TERRITORIAL QUESTION 
The constituent assembly elections of 1977 produced 
the first political mapping of Spanish society in 
almost forty years. The Centre party of Premier 
Suárez was the winning force followed by the 
Socialist Workers Party, with the Communist Party 
and the right-wing People’s Alliance lagging far 
behind. The Basque and Catalan nationalist parties 
obtained good results in their respective regions. 
The main purpose of the elections was to produce 
a constitution that could enjoy the widest possible 
consensus. The parliamentary commission in charge 
of its drafting was made up of representatives from 
the main political forces, including the Catalanist, 
but it excluded the Basque Nationalist Party, an 
absence that would have long-lasting consequences, 
since it called for abstention in the subsequent 
referendum on the Constitution. 
The Preliminary Part of the Constitution of 1978 
proclaims that it is “based on the indissoluble 
unity of the Spanish nation, the common and 
indivisible country of all Spaniards; it recognizes 
and guarantees the right to autonomy of the 
nationalities and regions of which it is composed, 
and the solidarity amongst them all.” Territorial 
self-government was to be articulated in the form 
of “autonomous communities”. Responding to 
the political longings of Catalonia and the Basque 
Country was the original purpose, but during 
the constitutional negotiations new territorial 
ambitions emerged. One possibility was to grant 
statutory self-government to Catalonia, the Basque 
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Country and Galicia, while allowing some degree 
of decentralization for the rest of the provinces. 
The ambitions of the most populated region in the 
country, Andalusia, derailed this option. The final 
solution was “coffee for everyone”—that is, the 
generalization of autonomy—as the Minister for the 
Regions famously described it. 
In this way, the differential features of the Catalan 
and Basque regions would be toned down against 
the background of general devolution, while 
attending to the legitimate territorial claims of 
other regions. The Constitution did not detail the 
number or names of such territorial units. Instead, 
it opened two procedural options for becoming 
an autonomous community: a “fast track” with 
higher administrative powers for those regions 
with a “historic” status as an autonomous region, 
such as those that had achieved or planned a 
statute of autonomy during the Second Republic 
(Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, plus 
the last-minute addition of Andalusia); and a 
“slow track” with an initially lower standard of 
self-government for the rest of the provinces. In 
the end, 17 communities were created, but over 
time, the political effect of these initial procedural 
distinctions was blurred, as the Constitution 
included additional routes for the devolution of 
power from the central government to the regions. 
Accordingly, the slow track communities have 
systematically tried to match the competencies 
obtained by the historic ones.
The territorial structuring of the country proved 
to be one of the democratic transition’s main 
destabilizing issues and it has resurfaced once 
again as a major challenge in the recent years. 
Delaying or uncoupling decentralization from the 
democratization process was never an option, as 
regional actors immediately used political liberties 
to demand territorial rights.  The level of violence 
created by ETA as well as leftist and right-wing 
paramilitary groups continued to increase during 
these transitional years. Although the counting 
differs depending on the sources, around 600 
persons were killed for political reasons in Spain 
between 1975 and 1983, well over half of them 
by Basque terrorism.6 By harassing the army 
and the police, ETA tried to instigate a coup that 
would derail the transition and, allegedly, pave 
the way for a revolutionary process. The new 
territorial outline devised in the Constitution was 
not popular with the military either, which had 
been entrusted by Franco with the safeguarding 
of national unity. Sabre rattling was perceptible. 
Several military conspiracies were dismantled by 
the secret services, but the legal consequences were 
remarkably lenient. Finally, on 23 February 1981, 
a detachment of the militarized police headed by 
a well-known conspirator stormed the Parliament 
as a new prime minister was voted in. At the same 
time, General Milans del Bosch occupied Valencia, 
the third largest city in the country, aided by an 
armoured division. Lacking the prior support of 
the army’s key commanders, the coup was not well 
planned; instead, it relied on the chain effect such a 
spectacular raid might have upon the discontented 
military ranks. Many officers waited to see how 
events would develop. The King’s speech, broadcast 
on television that same night, blocked the spread 
of the rebellion. The main conspirators were tried 
and jailed. In spite of this, the political atmosphere 
remained disturbed.
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A collateral result of the failed coup was an 
agreement by the Centre and Socialist parties to 
roll back the autonomy process partially by means 
of a “Law of Harmonization”, which the Basque 
and Catalan regional governments successfully 
challenged in the Constitutional Court. In the long-
term, the devolution process in Spain has depended 
more on political tempo than on constitutional 
regulations. Devolution has resulted from random 
negotiations between the central government and 
the main Catalan and Basque nationalist parties 
whenever a parliamentary majority was needed 
in Madrid. These parties, favoured by an electoral 
system that grants them some degree of over-
representation, have traditionally functioned as 
hinge parties in the central government. Their 
political cooperation was regularly rewarded by the 
central government with a new turn of the screw in 
the devolution process. 
Even if there is no canonical definition of federalism 
in Spain, the Spanish regime is a federal one in 
almost everything but name. The autonomous 
communities enjoy a higher degree of self-
government than the units of many nominally 
federal systems. An absolute majority of the 
national Parliament must approve regional statutes 
of autonomy, which, in turn, must comply with 
constitutional norms. In general, autonomous 
communities have a pragmatic character, with 
no closed assignment of competencies and no 
entitlement to assume residual powers; however, in 
some areas, they have functional priority over the 
competencies of the national government. In this 
sense, the territorial system has been open-ended 
and prone to both hosting and generating a wide 
range of asymmetrical features, such as different 
regional language policies and, most remarkably, 
the fiscal autonomy of the Basque Country and 
Navarre, a status which is now sought by Catalonia.
However, the seams split when reform of the 
Catalan statute of autonomy was thwarted in 
2006. In an attempt to displace the main Catalan 
nationalist party (Democratic Convergence of 
Catalonia) from over two decades of regional office, 
in 2003, the Catalan branch of the PSOE forged 
a tripartite coalition with a minority sovereignist 
party (Republican Left of Catalonia) and the 
regional ex-communist party. Since 1979, the 
reform and expansion of the old statute had been 
the main feature of their electoral program. Then 
in the opposition, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, 
the leader of the PSOE, welcomed this coalition, 
declaring that if he won the seat of prime minister 
in the upcoming national elections he would respect 
the statute passed by the Parliament of Catalonia 
within a new “plural Spain”. In March 2004, he 
did win following a swift electoral shift provoked 
by the Madrid train attacks and the discrediting of 
the conservative government for initially trying to 
conceal the jihadist connection and its presumed 
relation to the highly unpopular invasion of Iraq. 
The party formerly holding office in Catalonia, the 
DCC, then joined the efforts of the new tripartite 
government to amend the old statute of autonomy, 
thus initiating such a swelling process of regional 
inter-party competition, swinging alliances and 
escalating demands that the central government 
feared it was running out of control. The 
conservative opposition charged it was an attempt 
toward “breaking up Spain.” 
After a difficult negotiation, the Catalan parliament 
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voted on the new statute of autonomy in 2005 and 
submitted it to the Constitutional Commission in 
the Spanish parliament, which trimmed its most 
debatable sections. In March 2006, the Parliament 
finally voted on the revised draft of the statute. 
It was opposed only by the conservative People’s 
Party (PP) and the Republican Left of Catalonia, 
whose members, though in support of the statute, 
objected to its last-minute trimming-down. 
On 18 June, Catalonia voted on the statute in a 
referendum which produced a modest turnout with 
high support. Scarcely one month later, the Peoples 
Party submitted a complaint to the Constitutional 
Court touching on 114 out of 223 sections of the new 
Catalan statute. During the four years the Court 
took to make its decision, the PP attempted several 
backstage manoeuvers to alter the composition and 
internal balance of the tribunal. When the decision 
was issued, it declared 14 sections of the statute 
unconstitutional and revised 27 more, pronouncing 
the designation of Catalonia as a “nation” as “having 
no juridical consequences.”7 The sections deemed 
unconstitutional dealt with the preferential status 
of the Catalan language (judged as a source of 
inequality); the shielding of the decisions taken 
by the Catalan Council of Statutory Guarantees (a 
quasi-judicial body for statutory interpretation); 
the creation of an independent regional branch of 
the judiciary; the exclusive legislative competence 
of the regional government in matters shared with 
the state; and the unilateral limitation of Catalonia’s 
contribution to state expenses. 
Although public opinion was divided along political 
lines, the main national media concluded the 
decision had left the basic structure of the statute 
untouched, while limiting its most ambitious 
aspirations in respect to fiscal and judicial 
autonomy.8 However, the blow was political: a court 
whose reputation by then was seriously damaged 
had revised a charter that had been successively 
endorsed in the regional and the national 
parliaments and in a referendum. The decision 
created enormous discontent in Catalonia, with a 
massive demonstration organized in Barcelona the 
day after its announcement under a defiant banner 
that read, “We are a nation. We decide.” The Catalan 
impasse has taken a dramatic turn lately, with an 
unprecedented upsurge of sovereignism and the 
election in 2015 of a regional coalition government 
that has promised a swift, but utterly uncertain, 
accession to independence.
With the outbreak of the deepest economic crisis in 
the history of contemporary Spain, combined with 
massive cutbacks in public spending, a cold wind 
blows in Madrid nowadays, chilling any further 
efforts toward devolution. The public administration 
system, with its regional arms, is widely viewed as 
oversized, overlapping, financially irresponsible and 
patronage-ridden. In conservative circles especially, 
it is believed that instead of stabilizing the territorial 
tensions, the autonomies within the system have 
been used by peripheral nationalisms to carry out 
their own nation-building processes, feeding a 
historical narrative of victimization and blurring 
any sense of belonging to a common, centuries-old 
polity among the younger generations. Recent state 
legislation on municipal and regional finances, and 
on the content of the educational programs, has fed 
what is perceived as a backlash from the centre.
Accounting for Change in Diverse Societies    13Global Centre for Pluralism
The Spanish Transition Forty Years Later
V. THE DRIVERS OF 
PLURALISM IN THE 
SPANISH TRANSITION TO 
DEMOCRACY
Civil Society
During Spain’s democratic transition, the 
fundamental issue regarding civil society was the 
consolidation of its autonomy and vitality vis-à-
vis the nascent party system. The transition to 
democracy was to a substantial extent the result 
of civic mobilization against the dictatorship, 
which then became institutionalized in the 
political parties and the constitutional system. 
After the consolidation of democracy, the political 
character of citizens’ movements diminished with 
associational energies redirected towards other 
types of issues, such as the social economy and 
development aid. Thirty years later, however, civil 
society again played a fundamental role in causes 
such as the ending of terrorism in the Basque 
Country, the Catalan sovereignist process, the 
movement for historical memory, and the protest 
against corruption and the deterioration of the 
democratic system. In this sense, Spanish civil 
society has very often forged ahead of the political 
system and stood against its inertial tendencies.
The upsurge of the Catalan independence 
movement overlapped with the end of Basque 
terrorism. ETA announced a definitive ceasefire 
in 2011, with its last lethal attack one year before. 
The reasons for ETA’s decline are multiple. First, 
the Spanish police repeatedly and ever more swiftly 
penetrated and dismantled its organizational 
structure. Second, in a long-term strategy, the 
judiciary enforced new laws that exposed and 
outlawed the terrorist organization’s money 
laundering schemes, social collusion and political 
figureheads. Third, in an international scene that 
has come to know the devastating effects of Islamic 
terrorism, the phenomenon of Basque terrorism 
ceased to be seen as a residual conflict pushed by 
ethnic “freedom fighters” in a remote corner of 
the Iberian Peninsula. The last and most effective 
reason for ETA’s decline was the growing strength of 
grassroots peace movements in the Basque Country 
since the 1990s, together with the slow evolution 
of the radical nationalistic world—with Northern 
Ireland providing a model—towards institutional 
strategies. 
The Catalan experience has been very different. 
Catalan civil society has always been engaged in 
the defence of the cultural and linguistic patrimony 
of the region. Sport and cultural associations are 
traditional bearers of Catalan collective pride. The 
most successful and internationally known example 
is the Barcelona Football Club, which is “more than 
a club” according to its motto. Nationalistic violence 
was fleeting in the 1980s and, until very recently, 
independence was a marginal political option. The 
derailment of the reform of the statute of autonomy 
changed all of this. The National Day of Catalonia, 
a traditional civic celebration in Barcelona every 
11 September, for years usually gathered only 
political authorities and some small nationalistic 
groups. In 2012, it turned into a massive rally in 
favour of independence due to the efforts of two 
cultural and grassroots nationalist organizations, 
Òmnium Cultural and the so-called Catalan 
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National Assembly. This political turn encouraged 
the new regional premier, Artur Mas, to support 
the movement openly and take the lead, with the 
regional broadcasting system and the administrative 
apparatus thrown behind the cause. From this 
moment on, the Catalan government co-opted the 
mobilization for independence, following the paths 
of Québec and Scotland by attempting to organize a 
referendum on self-determination.
The economic and financial meltdown of 2008 had 
other notable effects on Spanish politics and the 
social mobilization of civil society. The absolute 
majority won by conservative Prime Minister 
Mariano Rajoy in 2011 allowed him to apply a 
tough program of economic reforms and social 
spending cutbacks, as demanded by the European 
Union and international creditors. The downsizing 
of the Spanish economy, shrinking social and 
welfare rights, the curtailment of collective labour 
agreements with a consequent drop in salaries, 
and the staggering rise of unemployment and 
evictions coincided with the uncovering of massive 
cases of political corruption at all territorial and 
administrative levels. In 2013, according to the 
General Council of the Judiciary, over 1,600 cases 
of corruption with political undertones were being 
investigated in Spain, which suggests the endemic 
nature of the problem.9 The position of Spain 
in the Corruption Perception Index produced 
by Transparency International, which ranks 
perceptions of countries from less to more corrupt, 
fell from 28 in 2008 to 40 in 2013.10 The range 
of the scams exposed is very wide, but many are 
perceptibly related to the speculative bubble created 
by 20 years of unremitting increases in property 
prices. This bulge fuelled all types of influence 
peddling, kickback schemes, and illegal donations 
related to urban zoning and the subcontracting of 
public works. Some of the main political parties, 
regionally and nationwide, have been heavily 
implicated in such practices. Even two member 
of the Royal Family have ended up in the dock, 
charged with illegal collection of commissions.
Within Spain, the current pervasive feeling that 
the political system is dysfunctional, the political 
class parasitical and institutional checks ineffective 
therefore comes as no surprise. The “indignado” 
movement that occupied downtown Madrid in May 
2011 was the first sign of growing political malaise. 
Within three years this diffuse social movement 
against inequality and corruption grew into an anti-
establishment political party, Podemos, which its 
opponents accuse of being populist. Leaving aside 
this ideological squabble, the success of Podemos 
in the 2015 elections has made it the third force in 
Parliament and given it control of two main cities. 
This result can be seen as a sign of generational 
change in Spanish politics but it also signals a 
deeper transformation. The traditional socialist/
conservative bipolar system, with the mainstream 
Basque and Catalan nationalist parties acting as 
a hinge for the formation of political majorities in 
Madrid, seems to have come to an end. Not only 
has the political spectrum become wider and more 
varied, the sovereignist drift of the Catalan pole of 
the old system has removed it from country-wide 
alliances. These shifts will undoubtedly affect the 
way territorial processes are addressed in the future.
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Religion
Together with the territorial question, the public 
status of the Catholic Church has been a matter 
of discord in the history of modern Spain. The 
Republican Constitution of 1931 declared the 
separation of state and church, put an end to 
public subsidies to the Church, unified the school 
system, regulated or dissolved the religious 
orders and limited the right of the clergy to teach 
without proper academic qualifications. The public 
school—a matter of concern for social and political 
reformers since the late 19th century—became the 
cultural bastion of the Republic, with local priests 
and schoolteachers replicating the rivalry between 
the Catholic Church and the state as agents of 
socialization. In a milieu marked by social unrest 
and deep political divisions, anti-clericalism was a 
catalyst for the conflicts that eventually led to the 
Civil War, with priests and teachers among the most 
victimized groups during it.
With the Constitution of 1977, Spain again ceased 
to be a confessional state. Article 16.3 of the 
Constitution declares that, “There shall be no state 
religion.” However, that same section goes on to 
state that, “The public authorities shall take the 
religious beliefs of Spanish society into account 
and shall consequently maintain appropriate 
cooperation relations with the Catholic Church 
and the other confessions.”11 With Spain’s history 
of violent religious conflict in mind, the purpose of 
this clause was to achieve a new compromise. The 
current regime of religious governance is sometimes 
branded “non-confessional” to distinguish it from 
a purely secular model, but there is no general 
agreement on the constitutional meaning of this 
term or its institutional consequences. In 1979, 
the Spanish government, then headed by centrist 
Premier Adolfo Suárez, signed a new Concordat with 
the Vatican.12 In it, the Catholic Church accepted 
the need to become financially self-sufficient within 
a foreseeable future. In 1987, the socialist cabinet 
of Felipe González concluded another agreement 
that provisionally assigned the Church a percentage 
of the personal income tax of Catholic taxpayers 
within Spain, with the proviso that the state would 
supplement this amount if it did not reach the 
expected total sum. In 2007, Premier Rodríguez 
Zapatero increased the percentage and made the tax 
permanent, while suppressing the state supplement. 
Nonetheless, the Church still indirectly receives 
an additional and substantial amount of public 
money through funds for Catholic schools, religion 
teachers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and the restoration of artistic patrimony.13
While being historically and culturally hegemonic, 
Catholicism is not the only confession in an 
increasingly multi-ethnic Spain. After a long period 
of resistance, Franco’s regime accepted a limited 
degree of religious freedom, but only during the 
democratic period has this issue been addressed 
in a more comprehensive way. The status of non-
Catholic denominations is specifically regulated by 
a law on religious liberty.14 This law opened the way 
for cooperation agreements between the state and 
those religions recognized as being “significantly 
rooted” in Spanish society. So far, this status has 
been granted to seven denominations, including 
Muslims, Jews and Evangelicals in 1992, Mormons 
in 2003, Jehovah’s Witnesses in 2006, Buddhists 
in 2007 and the Orthodox Church in 2010. Of 
these, only the first three groups have signed 
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collaboration accords with the state, although the 
development of these agreements has not been 
completed. Since Spanish law compels the different 
branches of every denomination to federate in order 
to negotiate with the state, occasional frictions 
have arisen concerning the representativeness of 
the resulting organizations. The legal standing of 
such agreements is, in any case, very different from 
those signed with the Vatican. The Concordats 
have the status of international treaties while the 
agreements with the Muslim, Jewish and Protestant 
communities are ordinary laws issued by the 
Spanish parliament.
Education and Language  
The organization of education is closely related to 
the religious issue. In fact, education has become 
a testing ground for the political interaction of 
the Catholic Church with the state. Since 1985 the 
Spanish educational system has been organized 
in two big sectors: a public school system and a 
network of private schools subsidized by the state. 
The latter is overwhelmingly composed of Catholic 
schools, which nowadays comprise about one third 
of the primary education in the country. Loyal to 
its historical tradition, the Church operates as a 
powerful lobby that mobilizes a web of associations, 
media and political connections to pressure the 
government whenever it feels its material or 
ideological interests are threatened. Catholic groups 
have thus systematically opposed the legal definition 
of education as a “public service”. They have 
instead framed education as a “right” connected to 
religious liberty and more concretely as the right 
of parents to procure a Catholic education for their 
children. Accordingly, they believe this right should 
be guaranteed by the state through educational 
subsidies to Catholic schools. The Concordat of 
1979 similarly established that public education 
should be “respectful” of Christian values and that 
the teaching of Catholic religion should be made 
available in public schools. Catholic instructors 
are thus paid by the state, but their appointment 
or dismissal is decided exclusively by the bishops. 
The Church has also opposed the introduction of 
“civic education” in the curriculum, which it judges 
as an attempt by the state to snatch the moral 
upbringing of the children from their parents. The 
education law passed by the conservative cabinet 
of Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy in 2013 has not 
only suppressed civic education and entrenched 
the presence of religion in the syllabus, it has also 
granted academic value to the marks obtained in 
the subject of religion.15 Given the wide contestation 
that this decision provoked, it seemed unlikely that 
the law would survive a change of government.
The use of vernaculars as languages of instruction 
in education has also been a recurrent source of 
political disagreement, particularly in Catalonia. 
Catalan, Galician and the Basque languages have 
a co-official status in their respective regions.  
This is also true for the variety of Catalan spoken 
in Valencia and the Balearic Islands, but only in 
Catalonia is the vernacular exclusively used for 
language immersion. That the Catalan language 
is not a “problem” but a tool for integration is 
a truism among the nationalist circles, which 
view any complaint in this field as mere political 
instrumentalization. In contrast to Ireland or 
Scotland, and to a lesser extent than in the Basque 
Country, language has traditionally been at the core 
of Catalonian nationalist ideology. Catalan entered a 
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situation of diglossia—a distinction between “high” 
and “low” usage—during Franco’s dictatorship. 
Although Catalan was the language of the upper 
classes and Spanish was the language of immigrants 
from the south, in this period Catalan was banned 
from schools, nor was it used by the administration 
or the media. The transition to democracy became 
an occasion to “normalize” the status of Catalan as 
the region’s native tongue. Still, Spanish is the first 
language of almost 60% of the region’s inhabitants. 
Throughout the democratic period, the Catalan 
government has systematically rejected the creation 
of two language-differentiated school systems. With 
the recent sovereignist upsurge, the imposition 
of Catalan unilingualism has found its way onto 
the nationalist agenda, creating uneasiness within 
the governing coalition as well as Catalan public 
opinion.16 In addition, several decisions of the 
Supreme Court have endorsed the right of Spanish-
speaking children to receive at least 25% of their 
education in their mother language, if their parents 
so decide. In any case, the political and cultural 
hegemony surrounding the issue of unilingualism 
is so strong that it is difficult to know if the lack of 
demand for it is real or merely pre-empted.
Memory
The politics of memory has erupted with force in 
the international political arena. Its consequences 
can be felt across a broad spectrum of issues, from 
international law to public ethics. Since the figure 
of the desaparecido (missing person) became 
internationally known in the 1970s through the 
military dictatorships in the Southern Cone, a 
new repertoire of public tools exist to address 
the reparation of human rights abuses, including 
political initiatives like “truth commissions”, 
normative categories like “transitional justice” and 
legal principles like the “universal jurisdiction” for 
crimes against humanity. The beneficiaries of these 
kinds of actions and policies have been the victims 
of past abuses, their relatives and descendants, 
but the ultimate field of contestation is the moral 
conscience of the societies in which such violations 
were committed. A standard to evaluate the 
dignity of a society is the way in which it treats its 
victims. This is how the demands for justice and 
symbolic restoration have entered the dimension of 
“historical memory.”
Unlike other transitional experiences in the world, 
in Spain there was no “truth commission” after the 
end of the Franco dictatorship, no reports on its 
crimes, and no symbolic reparations were paid to 
its victims. The Amnesty Law passed by the Spanish 
parliament at the beginning of the transition tried to 
cancel—from both legal and political perspectives—
the consequences of the Civil War and the 
subsequent dictatorship.17 This law protected not 
only those who had clandestinely resisted Franco 
or committed terrorist acts but also those officials 
of the regime responsible for violations of human 
rights. 
Unlike the contested laws of amnesty in Chile 
and Argentina, in Spain, the cancellation of penal 
responsibility for past crimes was met with a 
considerable degree of social consensus. No one 
took responsibility for the crimes of the past, and no 
one demanded it either. Economic compensation 
for those who had suffered imprisonment or some 
type of reprisal under Franco was delivered with 
considerable discretion. The fear of a political 
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entanglement prevented the inclusion of a 
restorative or therapeutic process for the victims 
in the democratization process. The generational 
gap between those who fought in the Civil War and 
the political actors who guided the transition to 
democracy also affected the outcome. Opposition 
groups were eager to consolidate the institutional 
changes that would permit their accession to 
power. They were also aware of the social support 
that Franco’s regime had developed over time. In 
this context, achieving vindication and justice for 
victims of the past were seen as less urgent than 
strengthening a political alternative for the future. 
Since both sides in the Civil War were responsible 
for committing atrocities, they concluded nothing 
would be won by digging up the past other than 
bringing old family demons to life. The alleged 
symmetry of guilt—that is, the proposition that all 
Spaniards were equally responsible for the outbreak 
of the war—helped reformist elements in Franco’s 
regime move toward democracy. The proposition 
also enabled the opposition to pursue reform, 
rather than the break up of the institutions of the 
dictatorship. However, the conflation of amnesty 
with amnesia produced a political transition 
without the kind of transitional justice that later 
proliferated all over the world. There was no healing 
of the historical wounds of the Civil War and the 
dictatorship; instead the past was at once closed and 
redeemed by throwing it into oblivion.
The consequences of this decision have become 
less and less tenable. The circumstances that 
conditioned the transition—mainly the fear of an 
authoritarian backlash—are nonexistent today. 
The stakes are therefore much higher now that the 
politics of memory have erupted in the political 
arena. The consensual urge with which the 
transition to democracy was legitimized prevented 
the reconciliation of Spanish society with its 
own past. Rather than an amnesty, the Spanish 
transition is now often viewed as a “pact of oblivion” 
or as a “silencing of the past.” The originators 
of the amnesty—conservative and progressive—
continue to stand side by side in efforts to preserve 
the established template and resist revisions of 
the transition narrative, but the new generations 
have lost the fears that menaced their forebears 
and thus have developed an interest in those 
issues which their parents did not wish to revive. 
It is the grandchildren of the victims, rather than 
their children, who are now seeking vindication 
for their memory and dignity. This new generation 
has opened a public debate that can no longer be 
postponed. The proclamation of a Law of Historical 
Memory in 2007 has been the most conspicuous 
result of this process.18 This law contains different 
types of measures: it recognizes the individual 
“right to memory;” it denies the legitimacy of the 
Francoist courts that violated fundamental rights, 
therefore repealing the validity of their norms and 
resolutions; it offers economic support for those 
excluded from former compensation programs; and 
it sets a series of rules both for the exhumation of 
mass graves and for the eradication of every form of 
apology of the Civil War and the dictatorship from 
the public space. As expected, the movement for 
the recovery of Spain’s historical memory has met 
strong opposition from conservative sectors. After 
the 2011 election, the cabinet of Prime Minister 
Rajoy did not revoke the Law of Historical Memory, 
but it has been left without financing. One of the 
main ideological drivers of some emerging political 
parties is criticism of the new narrative of the 
democratic transition. 
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As in the case of the victims of the Civil War and the 
dictatorship, the reconstruction of the democratic 
memory of Spanish society is once more on the 
table in the Basque region, where the debate over 
the recognition due to the victims of terrorism 
has settled. Acknowledging the harm done is a 
prerequisite for any pardon of imprisoned terrorists 
or offer of a Church-authored penitentiary benefit, 
as well as an integral part of the peace process. 
VI. SPAIN’S TRANSITION TO 
DEMOCRACY:  EMERGING 
LESSONS FOR PLURALISM
Of all the challenges confronting the Spanish 
transition to democracy, the territorial articulation 
of the country has proven the most difficult 
and longstanding. As the miscarried reform of 
the Catalan statute of autonomy has shown, 
decentralization remains an unresolved issue. If 
not for the decision of the Constitutional Court, 
the new statute might well have opened a new 
political cycle for the next generation. Instead, the 
fact remains that there are two regional societies 
in Spain—Catalonia and the Basque Country—with 
their own political centre of gravity that perceive 
themselves as “nations”. Aside from linguistic 
differences, the political ambitions fuelled by this 
perception cannot be explained without reference 
to the economic standing and urban character 
of both regions. Despite a deficit of political 
recognition, both regions enjoyed a privileged role 
in the industrialization of Spain, benefitting from 
an internally protected market and an influx of 
cheap labour from less wealthy areas of the country. 
This privileged role helps to explain the reticence 
of some regions to accept any sort of federal 
asymmetry that might bestow a further economic 
or fiscal advantage on Catalonia. In response, 
Catalonia criticizes the low economic performance 
and endemic dependence of Spain’s poorer regions 
on state subsidies. Unfortunately, there is no easy 
exit from the circular reasoning of nationalistic 
and populist rhetoric. Some political groups have 
proposed a referendum on self-determination as a 
possible resolution to the current impasse and as a 
deterrent for lukewarm sovereignists, but to have 
any effect a referendum must present an attractive 
proposal. Opponents of Catalan self-determination 
warn of the potential domino effect on other regions 
and the risk of Spain’s “Balkanization”. In any 
case, solving the Catalan puzzle will require some 
kind of constitutional reform as well as popular 
consultation.
Constitutional reform that recognizes a deeper level 
of differentiation between “historic” communities 
and the other regions as well as a more generous 
financial deal for Catalonia might present an 
alternative escape route from the present standoff. 
For many, such as former Prime Minister Rodríguez 
Zapatero, this option would require going back to 
square one of the Catalan statute to reformulate 
its original terms.  For others, the solution is to 
reorganize Spain as a “multinational state”. This 
option would not deter the pro-independence 
forces, but it would absorb a sizeable part of 
the Catalan constituency that does not wish to 
follow the independence path. A “multinational” 
Spain is not a readily acceptable option; however, 
for the rest of the country, which tends to see 
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Spain as a political nation, not as a patchwork of 
ethnicities. The multinational option will certainly 
not be accepted if it entails recognizing different 
sovereign constituent powers for each “nationality”. 
The Castilian-speaking regions are far from 
homogeneous, with some—such as Andalusia or 
the Canary Islands—also making ample use of 
the “national” and “differential” rhetoric. Local 
interests are deeply entrenched in the political and 
institutional history of the country. The problem is 
thus not self-government as such, but which type 
and for what purpose.
Despite its lack of popularity in the rest of the 
country, all political parties in the Spanish 
Parliament voted for the new Catalan statute, except 
for the two parties more clearly identified with 
Spanish and Catalan nationalism—the People’s 
Party and the Republican Left of Catalonia—for 
which the statute offered either too much or 
too little. Reluctance to embrace pluralism is 
not exclusive to the “majority” nationality. The 
“minority” nationalities have also been torn apart 
by rigid definitions of their collective identity. 
Nationalism bitterly divided Basque society in the 
1970s and 1980s, and it has now separated Catalan 
society into two unstable and fluctuating opinion 
blocs whose preferences are difficult to process 
politically. One problem seems to lie with the 
dynamics of nationalist politics in general, not just 
with the collective self-perception of the different 
regions. The “nation” is a powerful concept when 
used to influence mindsets, but of little help and 
flexibility when it comes to defining it in a juridical 
and political frame. This challenge is particularly 
evident in complex and heterogeneous societies 
such as Spain. 
“Multiculturalism” became a buzzword in the 1990s, 
when the first large wave of foreign immigration 
arrived in the country, principally from other parts 
of Europe, North Africa and Latin America. The 
handicaps posed by some of the compromises 
made during the transition—such as the incomplete 
secularization of some public institutions—then 
became obvious. Apart from some modules for 
compensatory education in primary school, no 
specific pluralist policies were devised for the 
integration of immigrants. The possibility of 
discrimination was a source of concern, but no 
legislation or affirmative action programs were 
encouraged. The labour market, the legal system 
and the welfare state—mainly public health and 
educational services, both provided on a regional 
basis—were deemed sufficient. In the regions with 
vernacular and militant identities, the integration of 
foreign immigrants became an additional challenge. 
This challenge was particularly felt in Catalonia, 
where, together with Madrid and the Mediterranean 
regions, the largest percentage of the immigrant 
population resides. The “emergent nationalism” of 
Catalonia has therefore struggled simultaneously 
to integrate newcomers into the local society while 
also attempting to loosen the region’s links with 
the central government. These challenges apply 
two very different normative frames: internal 
integration versus external autonomy. The 
inevitable political tensions are reflected in the 
legal battles that citizens and governments (both 
central and regional) have waged in the courts 
during the last decades for individual rights and 
administrative competence. This kind of political 
contention is to some extent a usual characteristic 
of federal states, but a substantial part of Spain’s 
recent experiences also derives from the dynamics 
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of nationalist politics. Even if the normative frame 
of nationalism is not cast in iron, the principles of 
individual and collective self-determination display 
conflicting interfaces that are not resolved by   the 
grand narratives of “nation building”, “sovereignty”, 
“emancipation” and the like. Nationalist identity 
politics cannot be reconciled with pluralist 
principles in the absence of a deep-rooted political 
culture that accepts and promotes multiple 
affiliations.
To a certain extent, Spain’s institutional system has 
helped channel nationalistic politics in pluralist-
friendly ways, but its overall success has been 
eroded with the years. The electorate has learned 
to cast different votes in the local, regional and 
national elections, thus indirectly fostering a 
territorial system of political checks and balances, 
but regional self-government did not stem the 
mounting terrorist campaign launched by ETA in 
the 1970s—although the situation could have been 
considerably worse without it. In spite of some 
obvious abuses by the police forces during the early 
years of the transition, many political leaders in 
the Basque region adopted an equidistant stance 
for too long, describing nationalist violence as the 
undesirable result of an arcane conflict between the 
“state” and the “Basque people”. In Catalonia, court 
decisions concerning linguistic rights have been 
strategically accepted or ignored by the Catalan 
government depending on vested interests. And 
at the national level some political groups have 
manifestly attempted to stack the Constitutional 
Court for partisan purposes, particularly during 
the reform of the Catalan statute, a strategy that 
proved fatal to the reform. A political system of such 
complexity as the Spanish system cannot operate 
without legitimate court authority, particularly 
when the country’s territorial balance depends 
upon these adjudicative functions. The preservation 
of judicial independence therefore emerges as an 
obvious but nonetheless relevant lesson from the 
Spanish experience for pluralism. A legitimized 
system of neutral rules and independent arbiters is 
crucial to appease possible perceptions of regional 
disloyalty or majoritarian hegemony. The role of 
intellectuals, academics and the media as creators of 
public opinion cannot be disregarded in this matter. 
Collective identity is to a large extent a narrative 
process whose normative underpinnings need to be 
publicly examined and evaluated.
For many Spaniards, the secularization of the 
state is pending since the transition to democracy. 
According to this view, the privileges granted to 
the Catholic Church by the current Concordat 
contradict the principles of equal respect, separation 
between political power and religious communities, 
and the religious neutrality of the state that 
should inspire a pluralist democracy.19 The formal 
banner of religious liberty conceals the fact that, 
in many aspects, being a Catholic continues to 
be significantly easier in Spain than holding a 
different confession or none. This is not merely a 
matter of cultural hegemony or social tradition but 
of state intervention as well. The public status of 
the Catholic Church and the political debate over 
its status reflect the internal cleavages of Spanish 
society and the diminishing weight of organized 
religion within a general context of secularization. 
Over three-quarters of Spaniards declare themselves 
Catholic believers, although they do not necessarily 
share the patrimonial attitude of the high ranks 
of the Church towards the state or their social 
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morals.20 Although Catholicism is still a prevailing 
cultural force in the country, it has lost much of its 
former clout as a political lever. The mobilization of 
the Catholic Church vis-à-vis the state—combined 
with the inertia of its historical hegemony—
compensates for this diminished social grip and 
reveals the deep-rooted reliance of the Spanish 
Church on public resources and state cooperation. 
Attempts to placate Church belligerence against 
groundbreaking initiatives, such as gay marriage 
or abortion, with fiscal gifts have been in vain, 
as socialist Prime Minister Rodríguez Zapatero 
experienced firsthand. From a democratic 
perspective, outreach to the majority religious 
sectors of society with a sensibility for these new 
civil rights would have made more sense.
Finally, the tacit agreement to bury the past 
during the transition to democracy has not been 
without consequences. The amnesia of the Spanish 
democracy has deprived it of a solid reference 
point. Historical memory is not about criminal 
responsibility. It makes no sense to demand 
this type of accountability for crimes that were 
committed over half a century ago. The criminals 
and their victims are long dead. Acknowledging 
memory nevertheless has therapeutic, political 
and didactic qualities. The collective identity of a 
society and the meaning attributed to its institutions 
are ingrained in the perception of historical time. 
Narratives of collective identity provide a reference 
for the individuals with the past of their country. 
A connection with the past is the main way in 
which citizens come to accept responsibility for 
the actions of former generations. Spanish society 
has yet to deal with the long-term consequences 
of the Civil War and the dictatorship from a fuller 
perspective than one-sided demands for reparation 
or the political expediency of strategic forgetfulness. 
The result of this deficit of memory has been 
the confusing impression that Spain’s current 
democratic institutions owe their political pedigree 
as much to the “pacifying” effects of late Francoism 
as to the efforts of opponents to it. The conventional 
narrative thus portrays the Spanish democracy as a 
primeval act, divorced from history, rather than as 
the restoration of an interrupted political tradition. 
Memory, not forgetfulness, enhances the moral and 
political quality of collective life. To have sympathy 
for victims, to restore their dignity symbolically and 
to place them in our memory, these are tasks whose 
rightful resolution determines the civic health and 
vitality of a democratic and pluralist community 
that is able to balance competing aspirations. 
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